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Supreme Court No. 97895-6  
(COA No. 51098-7-II)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

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STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

JEREMIAH ALLEN TEAS,

Appellant.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE  
STATE OF WASHINGTON FOR CLARK COUNTY

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PETITION FOR REVIEW

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## **A. IDENTITY OF PETITIONER AND COURT OF APPEALS DECISION**

Jeremiah Allen Teas, petitioner here and appellant below, asks this Court to accept review of a published Court of Appeals decision affirming his conviction and sentence of life without the possibility of parole. A copy of the Court of Appeals' opinion<sup>1</sup> and the order denying Mr. Teas' motion for reconsideration<sup>2</sup> are attached to this petition.

## **B. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW**

1. It is improper for a prosecutor to create an inference that a defendant is guilty based on his exercise of his constitutional rights. Mr. Teas testified at his own trial. In turn, during closing arguments, the prosecutor repeatedly created an inference that Mr. Teas' decision to testify was evidence of his guilt, claiming he only exercised his right to testify "because he saw the overwhelming evidence against him."

The Court of Appeals agreed the prosecutor's repeated attacks on Mr. Teas' right to testify were improper. However, it did not reverse, finding that because Mr. Teas did not object to the misconduct, it had to *first* employ the "flagrant and ill-intentioned standard" *before* assessing whether this error could be raised for the first time on appeal as a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. It is more difficult for a

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<sup>1</sup> Appendix A.

<sup>2</sup> Appendix B.

defendant to obtain relief under the “flagrant and ill-intentioned standard” because under this standard, a defendant not only has to demonstrate that the misconduct was flagrant and ill-intentioned, but also that no instruction could have cured the prosecutor’s misconduct.

(a) This Court has consistently applied a straightforward RAP 2.5(a)(3) manifest constitutional error analysis for numerous constitutional violations. Should this Court accept review because the Court of Appeals’ imposition of an additional onerous threshold analysis is wholly incompatible with RAP 2.5(a)(3)? RAP 13.4(b)(3); RAP 13.4(b)(4).

(b) In *State v. Moreno*, 132 Wn. App. 663, 132 P.3d 1137 (2006), the prosecutor created an impermissible inference that the defendant was guilty based on his exercise of his right to represent himself. The defendant did not object to the prosecutor’s comments, but the defendant challenged the prosecutor’s comments on appeal. Division One only conducted a RAP 2.5(a)(3) assessment to determine whether to reach the merits of the defendant’s argument. Should this Court accept review because this Division Two opinion conflicts with Division One’s opinion in *Moreno*? RAP 13.4(b)(2).

(c) In *State v. Emery*, 174 Wn.2d 741, 278 P.3d 653 (2012), this Court held that prosecutorial comments diluting the State’s burden of proof did not trigger a constitutional harmless error analysis. This is

because when a prosecutor dilutes his or her burden of proof, he or she is not attacking the defendant's direct exercise of his constitutional rights; rather, the prosecutor is instead, in essence, misstating the law. However, the Court of Appeals misunderstood *Emery* as necessitating a "flagrant and ill-intentioned" threshold analysis before conducting a RAP 2.5(a)(3) for all unpreserved prosecutorial comments that create an inference that the defendant is guilty based on his exercise of his constitutional rights.

Should this Court accept review because the Court of Appeals misinterpreted *Emery*? RAP 13.4(b)(1).

(d) This Court has repeatedly held that claims of prosecutorial misconduct must be examined as a whole. In addition to the prosecutor repeatedly assailing Mr. Teas' credibility by creating an inference that Mr. Teas was guilty based on his exercise of his right to testify, the prosecutor also made an inappropriate comment regarding the tragic events of 9/11 in order to meet its burden. Should this Court reverse because the Court of Appeals' opinion neglects to examine the pervasive misconduct in this case as a whole? RAP 13.4(b)(1).

(e) In *State v. Martin*, 171 Wn.2d 521, 252 P.3d 872 (2011), this Court held that under article I, section 22, it is appropriate for a prosecutor to suggest that the defendant tailored his testimony to conform

to the evidence presented at trial during cross-examination; however, this Court stated it is inappropriate for a prosecutor to suggest the defendant tailored his testimony during summation. During summation, the prosecutor argued Mr. Teas tailored his testimony. However, the Court of Appeals believed this was appropriate. Should this Court reverse because the Court of Appeals' opinion fails to follow this Court's ruling in *Martin*? RAP 13.4(b)(1); RAP 13.4(b)(3).

2. In *State v. W.R.*, 181 Wn.2d 757, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014), this Court held the State, not the defendant, bears the burden of disproving consent when the defendant's defense to a rape charge is that the complainant consented to sex. However, in dicta, this Court asserted that courts need not instruct the jury on this defense.

At trial, both the State and Mr. Teas presented enough evidence to warrant a consent instruction. The trial court refused to issue the instruction. Relying on this Court's dicta in *W.R.*, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that because the State had to prove a lack of consent as part of its burden of proof, a consent instruction was unnecessary.

Both this Court's dicta and the Court of Appeals' reasoning is at odds with both the right to present a defense and other defense doctrines. For example, both diminished capacity and voluntary intoxication can

negate the mens rea element of many crimes, and yet this Court has stated that defendants that present evidence of these defenses are entitled to instructions consistent with these defenses. Should this Court accept review because *W.R.*'s dicta is incompatible with the right to present a defense and inconsistent with this Court's holdings regarding jury instructions for other defenses? RAP 13.4(b)(1); RAP 13.4(b)(3).

3. This Court recently held that under article I, section 14 of our constitution, it is permissible to impose life without the possibility of parole pursuant to our state's three strikes law if one of the predicate offenses occurred when the defendant was a youth. Here, however, Mr. Teas was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole based on our state's two strikes law. Mr. Teas' first strike offense occurred when he was between the ages of 17 and 19. Should this Court accept review to determine whether article I, section 14 of our constitution allows the imposition of life without the possibility of parole for a two strike offense where one of the strikes occurred when the defendant was a youth? RAP 13.4(b)(3); RAP 13.4(b)(4).

### **C. STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

Jeremiah Allen Teas was at work perusing Backpages.com under the "adult services" section when he clicked on the subcategory of "escort services." RP 646-48. After scrolling through this subcategory, he



stumbled upon an advertisement posted by a woman who claimed her name was “Miley.” RP 646-47. The advertisement was for a “massage.” Mr. Teas called the phone number listed in the advertisement and inquired with “Miley” about her services. RP 650. The two agreed to meet after Mr. Teas finished work. RP 650. Mr. Teas was hoping to receive a “happy ending.” RP 673.

After leaving work, Mr. Teas arrived at “Miley’s” apartment, where she directed Mr. Teas into her bedroom. RP 652, 654. The bedroom did not contain any massage tables. RP 654. Mr. Teas took off his shoes and “Miley” asked him to take off his pants, so he took off his belt and pulled his pants down to his mid-thigh. RP 657. He then took off “Miley’s” pants. RP 657. Mr. Teas asked “Miley” if they could kiss or if she could perform oral sex on him, but she refused. RP 657. Upon “Miley’s” request, Mr. Teas put on a condom; shortly afterwards, he attempted to have intercourse with her, but he could not become erect. RP 657-58.

“Miley” asked Mr. Teas several times if she could get him some lubrication or a penis pump to help him become erect. RP 659. Mr. Teas tried to get himself erect while he reached in his pocket to try and pull out some money. His pocketknife fell out. RP 659. “Miley” ran away,

screaming. RP 659-60. Confused, Mr. Teas grabbed his belongings and left the apartment. RP 663.

While walking down the street after leaving the apartment, he heard “Miley” yelling from a car, “I’m going to get you. I have your stuff.” RP 661. “Miley” also yelled other obscene language at Mr. Teas. RP 661.

A few days later, the police arrested Mr. Teas. When the police interviewed him, Mr. Teas denied any encounter with “Miley” and instead said he was in the area of her apartment but only to visit a friend. RP 172. Mr. Teas later admitted to initially denying the encounter with “Miley” because he was ashamed and did not want his family to learn he was seeking escort services. RP 665-66.

The police arrested Mr. Teas because “Miley” (whose real name is not actually “Miley” and will be referred to in the rest of this brief by her true initials, “R.C.”) reported that Mr. Teas raped her, and the State later charged Mr. Teas with rape in the first degree. CP 2, 5. R.C. told the police that as soon as Mr. Teas entered her apartment, he shoved her onto a bed, held a knife to her throat, and said he was going to rape her. CP 2. However, at trial, she told the jury that Mr. Teas jumped on her back “like he was trying to get a piggyback ride” and wielded a knife to her throat. RP 296. R.C. said she told Mr. Teas she would do whatever he wanted her

to do if he put his knife away. RP 298. According to R.C., when Mr. Teas put the knife in his pocket, she told him she was not going to “do this” with a knife in his pocket, so she instructed him to put the knife in his backpack, and he obliged. RP 298.

Though she previously said she would do “whatever [Mr. Teas] wanted [her] to do” in order to get Mr. Teas to put down the knife, R.C. testified she denied Mr. Teas’ request to kiss or have her perform oral sex on him. RP 297-98. R.C. said Mr. Teas honored these requests. RP 298. She testified that she asked Mr. Teas put on a condom, and he also obliged this request. RP 298-99.

R.C claimed Mr. Teas had trouble getting an erection, but he nevertheless penetrated her for about two minutes. RP 299. Though she initially told the police Mr. Teas asked for some lubrication, she later testified that she was the one who actually proposed getting lubrication for Mr. Teas as a ruse to escape from the bedroom. RP 302. R.C. avowed that she and Mr. Teas struggled at the door before she ran out screaming for help from her roommate. RP 302. She claimed Mr. Teas had blood on his hand and left blood on her sheet and on her bra strap. RP 315. But everything that resembled blood from R.C.’s bedroom tested negative for Mr. Teas’ DNA. RP 627-28.

During her testimony, R.C. maintained that although she posted under the “adult services” of Backpages.com under the subcategory of “escorts,” she only delivered massage services. RP 325-25, 328. R.C. is not a licensed massage therapist. RP 326. R.C. has three prior theft convictions, which are all crimes of dishonesty. RP 321-22.

Mr. Teas testified at his trial. He also requested a jury instruction on consent, which the court refused. RP 687.

During closing argument, the prosecutor made several comments regarding Mr. Teas’ decision to exercise his right to testify. First, the prosecutor explained that because Mr. Teas initially denied being in the apartment with R.C., the State had to obtain and present physical evidence to prove he was there. RP 745-46. Afterwards, the State described all of the evidence it presented at trial and commented,

So that's another reason why, ladies and gentlemen, *the defendant decided to testify. He saw the overwhelming evidence against him. Couldn't deny the DNA. Could not deny the DNA.*

RP 747 (emphasis added).

The prosecutor went on to describe the DNA found on the hat, the bedsheet, and R.C.’s left breast. RP 747-48. He then commented,

Again, the estimated probability of selecting an unrelated individual at random in the U.S. population with a matching [DNA] profile is 1 in 130 quintillion. These are things that the defendant cannot dispute, cannot rebut. *And so that's why he got on the stand yesterday and came -- came up*

*with a story to try and explain away what happened. And he wrapped up some of the things that have been proved to be true. For example, his presence there, because he can't deny that he wasn't there because he was. But he had to explain why and how and then deny that he was able to engage in sexual intercourse.*

RP 747-48 (emphases added).

The prosecutor also discussed 9/11 during his closing argument:

*the way that [the pocketknife] was used, the manner in which it was used, the crime in which it was used in, constitutes a deadly weapon. Now, it is not a gun. It's not a firearm. It's not a pistol, a revolver, because those are, per se, deadly weapons. Okay? But the manner in which this instrument, this implement was used, with either blade, and the proximity to a person's neck, constitutes a deadly weapon. And we know that something like this has been used in the past. Okay? I'm not saying -- what I'm about to say, and I will preface this by saying this is not a terrorist act. This is not even close to 9/11. Okay? But we all know what was reported about the people who meant to harm on -- on those planes that crashed into the twin towers. What did they have? Box cutters. This, ladies and gentlemen, with this blade exposed, the manner in which it was used, is a deadly weapon.*

RP 735-36 (emphases added).

Furthermore, the prosecutor claimed R.C.'s version of what happened was always consistent, which was false. RP 725. The jury convicted Mr. Teas of rape in the first degree. CP 42.

Mr. Teas has a prior conviction for child molestation in the first degree. RP 789. This crime occurred between 1994 and 1996, when Mr. Teas was between the ages of 17 and 19 years old. Op. at 6. Based on this crime and the current conviction, the court had no choice but to impose

life without parole pursuant to the Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA). RP 796-77. Mr. Teas appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence of life without the possibility of parole. Op. at 1.

#### **D. ARGUMENT**

**1. This Court should accept review because the Court of Appeals’ opinion unnecessarily deviates from RAP 2.5(a)(3) and presents important questions concerning the extent of the right to testify under article I, section 22.**

The Court of Appeals grievously misapprehended *Emery*, the applicability of RAP 2.5(a)(3), and the extent of article I, section 22’s protections of the right to testify. It also neglected to examine the pervasive misconduct that occurred throughout Mr. Teas’ trial in the context of the entire record and the issues in his case. Accordingly, this Court should accept review.

- a. *Emery* does not mandate that all unpreserved prosecutorial attacks on a defendant’s constitutional rights be assessed under the “flagrant and ill-intentioned standard;” furthermore, application of this standard is inconsistent with RAP 2.5(a)(3).

Contrary to *Emery* and this Court’s precedent, the Court of Appeals employed the “flagrant and ill-intentioned” standard rather than the constitutional harmless error test to assess whether it should reverse due to the prosecutor’s inappropriate attack on Mr. Teas’ right to testify.

Op. at 8. Moreover, the “flagrant and ill-intentioned” standard is inconsistent with RAP 2.5(a)(3). Accordingly, this Court should accept review.

In *Emery*, the defendant asked this Court to employ the constitutional harmless error standard rather than the “flagrant and ill-intentioned” standard to assess whether a prosecutor’s (unpreserved) improper comments that diluted the State’s burden to prove its case warranted reversal. 174 Wn.2d at 756. This Court declined to do so, but it observed that it has “long held that the constitutional harmless error standard applies to *direct* constitutional claims involving prosecutors’ improper arguments.” *Id.* at 757. In doing so, this Court referenced *State v. Easter*, 130 Wn.2d 228, 922 P.2d 1285 (1996), which held it was improper both for a prosecutor to elicit testimony concerning a defendant’s exercise of his pre-arrest silence and for the prosecutor to mention the defendant’s pre-arrest silence during summation. *Id.* This Court also referenced *State v. Fricks*, 91 Wn.2d 391, 396-97, 588 P.2d 1328 (1979), which held it was improper for a prosecutor to both elicit testimony concerning the defendant’s exercise of his right to post-arrest silence and to mention the defendant’s exercise of his post-arrest silence during the State’s case-in-chief.

This Court's reference to these two cases indicate that it has *always* applied the constitutional harmless error standard when a prosecutor *directly* attacks the defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights. While a prosecutor's arguments diluting its burden of proof may touch upon the defendant's right to have the State meet its case beyond a reasonable doubt, it does not constitute a *direct* attack on a defendant's constitutional rights. *See Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 763. This is because the defendant has not *himself* exercised his right when the prosecutor dilutes its burden of proof; rather, the prosecutor is *misstating* its burden of proof, which is tantamount to a misstatement of the law.

On the other hand, a prosecutor's arguments concerning a defendant's pre-arrest silence, post-arrest silence, or decision to testify *directly* comments on a defendant's exercise of his constitutional rights. A defendant necessarily exercises his right to remain silent when he declines to speak to the police both before and after his arrest. A defendant exercises his right to represent himself when he goes pro se, and so it is improper for a prosecutor to create an inference that he is guilty based on his exercise of this right. *State v. Moreno*, 132 Wn. App. 663, 672, 132 P.3d 1137 (2006). And a defendant exercises his right to testify when he testifies; thus, a prosecutor *directly* comments on this exercise of his constitutional rights when he creates an inference that this somehow



evinces that he is guilty. Consequently, unpreserved *direct* attacks on a defendant's constitutional right mandate a RAP 2.5(a)(3) analysis.

Significantly, nowhere in *Emery* does this Court state it was abandoning the constitutional harmless error test in regards to direct attacks on a defendant's rights. Instead, *Emery* merely holds that the constitutional harmless error test does not apply where the defendant challenges the State's dilution of its burden of proof. *Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 757 ("We decline to adopt the constitutional harmless error standard *here* for three reasons") (emphasis added). The Court of Appeals' opinion reads *Emery* too broadly.

Moreover, it is inconsistent with RAP 2.5(a)(3) for a court to *first* consider whether a prosecutor's direct attack on a defendant's exercise of his constitutional right is so flagrant and ill-intentioned that no instruction could cure it *before* it employs the harmless error standard. No other constitutional claim raised for the first time on appeal is subject to this threshold analysis.

RAP 2.5(a)(3) merely requires a defendant to identify the constitutional error and demonstrate how the error actually affected his rights at trial. *State v. Lamar*, 180 Wn.2d 576, 583, 327 P.3d 46 (2014); accord *State v. A.M.*, \_\_\_ Wn.2d \_\_\_, 448 P.3d 35 (2019). Under RAP 2.5(a)(3), this Court assesses whether the error actually affected the

defendant's rights at trial by examining whether the error resulted in actual prejudice, which means the error had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial. *Lamar*, 180 Wn.2d at 583. In making this assessment, this Court assesses (1) whether the trial court could have corrected the error; and (2) whether the record is sufficient to review the claim. *Id.*

On the other hand, the flagrant and ill-intentioned standard requires the defendant to prove (1) the prosecutor's conduct was flagrant and ill-intentioned; and (2) *no instruction* could have cured it. *In the Matter of the Pers. Restraint of Glasmann*, 175 Wn.2d 696, 704-05, 286 P.3d 673 (2012). This second requirement imposes an additional hurdle that is absent when a defendant makes any other claim under RAP 2.5(a)(3). No reason exists for this Court to carve out an exception RAP 2.5(a)(3) in instances of prosecutorial misconduct. Indeed, Division One has recognized that a mere RAP 2.5(a)(3) analysis should apply. *Moreno*, 132 Wn. App. at 672.

- b. Contrary to this Court's precedent, the Court of Appeals' opinion takes a piecemeal rather than holistic approach to assess whether the misconduct that pervaded throughout Mr. Teas' trial warranted reversal.

This Court should accept review because the Court of Appeals' opinion isolates each instance of the misconduct that occurred in this case

rather than assessing the misconduct as a whole. However, this Court has held that prosecutorial misconduct must be examined as a whole in light of the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the instructions given to the jury. *State v. Monday*, 171 Wn.2d 667, 675, 257 P.3d 551 (2011).

The central issue the jury was tasked with assessing in this case was deciding who was more credible: Mr. Teas or the complainant. Mr. Teas initially denied any encounter with the complainant to the police. However, he later explained he denied it because he was ashamed and did not want his family to know that he was seeking out escort services. RP 172, RP 665-66.

The complainant posted on Backpages.com under the pseudonym “Miley” under the subcategory “Escort Services” advertising for a “massage,” but she neither has a massage license nor does her home contain any massage tables. RP326, 646-48, 654. Still, she denied providing anything except massage services. RP 325, 328. The complainant was previously convicted of three crimes of dishonesty. RP 321-22. Moreover, while the complainant claimed Mr. Teas had a bloody cut on his hand and left blood on both her person and her bedroom, the forensic evidence presented at trial tested negative for Mr. Teas’ blood. RP 315, 333-34, 417, 627-28, 757.

The prosecutor weaponized Mr. Teas' exercise of his right to testify three separate times in closing argument in order to tarnish Mr. Teas' credibility. Each time, the prosecutor essentially told the jury to ignore Mr. Teas' story because he only exercised his right to testify to lie to them. RP 747-48. And the prosecutor compounded this misconduct when he argued Mr. Teas used the same weapon the terrorists used to take down the planes during 9/11, a national tragedy. RP 735-36. This painted Mr. Teas in a considerably unflattering light, and in cases like Mr. Teas' that involve credibility contests, improper arguments that villainize a defendant can readily become a deciding factor for the jury. *See State v. Walker*, 164 Wn. App. 724, 738, 265 P.3d 191 (2011).

The prosecutor's inappropriate argument concerning 9/11 also concerned another issue the jury was tasked with deciding in this case: whether the knife at issue was a deadly weapon. CP 35. The prosecutor's argument here conveyed the following message to the jury: if the 9/11 hijackers could inspire enough fear with similar weapons to have the ability to take down entire planes, then surely the weapon Mr. Teas allegedly used could constitute a deadly weapon.

The Court of Appeals' approach to the misconduct was incompatible with this Court's precedent.

- c. The Court of Appeals' opinion overlooks *Martin's* reasoning, which conveys that under article I, section 22, prosecutorial suggestions of tailoring are only appropriate during cross-examination, not during summation.

During summation, the prosecutor also insinuated that Mr. Teas tailored his testimony based on the testimony of others. RP 747-48.

Here in Washington, the right to testify is explicitly protected under article I, section 22 of our constitution, and so is a defendant's right to be present at trial and to mount a defense. Const. art. I, § 22.

Accordingly, this Court concluded that article I, section 22 of our state constitution is more protective of these rights than the federal constitution. *State v. Martin*, 171 Wn.2d 521, 533, 537-38, 252 P.3d 872 (2011).

*Martin* explored the boundaries of these heightened rights with respect to prosecutorial suggestions of a defendant tailoring his testimony during cross-examination. In *Martin*, the defendant testified during his trial. *Id.* at 524. During cross-examination, the prosecutor highlighted that the defendant "had the advantage" of hearing all the testimony produced at trial and also had the benefit of examining the State's evidence. *Id.* at 524-25. On appeal, the defendant contended the State improperly implied he tailored his testimony and that this infringed on his article I, section 22

right to testify, appear and defend at his trial, and meet witnesses face-to-face. *Id.* at 533.

To determine whether the prosecutor's actions ran counter to article I, section 22, this Court turned to a somewhat factually similar United States Supreme Court case. *Id.* at 534. That case, *Portuondo v. Agard*, 529 U.S. 61, 120 S. Ct. 1119, 146 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2000), involved a defendant who challenged his conviction under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment because after he testified, the prosecutor suggested in closing argument that the defendant tailored his testimony because he had the constitutional ability to hear all the witnesses. The majority of the court found no constitutional error. *Id.* at 73.

However, this Court did not stop at the majority's opinion and instead looked to the reasoning in Justice Ginsburg's dissent to assess the boundaries of article I, section 22's protections. *Martin*, 171 Wn.2d at 534. This Court's opinion in *Martin* selects portions of Justice Ginsburg's dissent where she notes that while it was permissible for a prosecutor to pose questions to a defendant during cross-examination that suggest the defendant tailored his testimony, she believed it was impermissible for a prosecutor to make such a suggestion during closing argument. *Id.* at 535 (*referencing Portuondo*, 529 U.S. at 78-79) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This is because by the time of closing, the jury is unable to "measure a

defendant's credibility by evaluating the defendant's response to the accusation, for the broadside is fired after the defense has submitted its case." *Portuondo*, 529 U.S. at 78 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).

This Court agreed with this portion of the reasoning in Justice Ginsburg's dissent and held it was proper for a prosecutor to suggest a defendant tailored his testimony during cross-examination. *Martin*, 171 Wn.2d at 535-36. In so holding, this Court noted this was because "it is *during cross-examination, not closing argument*, when the jury has the opportunity to determine whether the defendant is exhibiting untrustworthiness." *Id.* at 535-36 (emphasis added). This Court additionally stressed, "indeed, a primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-examination, the principal means by which the believability of a witness and the truth of the testimony are tested." *Id.*

The Court of Appeals agreed that the prosecutor suggested that Mr. Teas tailored his testimony during summation. Op. at 10-12. However, it believed this was appropriate because it noted the accusations of tailoring here were specific, as in *Martin*. Op. at 11-12. But *Martin* expressly reasoned that accusations of tailoring were appropriate during cross-examination because it is during cross-examination that the jury has the ability to observe the defendant's reaction to the accusation. On the other

hand, during closing argument, the jury does not have the same opportunity to see how the defendant responds to accusations of tailoring. In *Martin*, this Court did not draw a distinction between specific and generic accusations of tailoring during closing argument; instead, it drew a distinction between accusations of tailoring during cross-examination and accusations of tailoring during closing argument.

This Court should accept review. RAP 13.4(b)(1); RAP 13.4(b)(2); RAP 13.4(b)(3); RAP 13.4(b)(4).

**2. The Court of Appeals’ opinion raises important questions concerning the right to instruct a jury on one’s own theory of defense.**

After both the State and Mr. Teas presented more than a sufficient quantum of evidence to demonstrate that the sexual encounter between Mr. Teas and R.C. was consensual, Mr. Teas attempted to instruct the jury on the defense of consent. CP 18; RP 685; *see* Br. of App. at 24-30. The trial court refused, and the Court of Appeals held reversal was unwarranted. RP 688; Op. at 17-18. In doing so, the court relied on dicta from *W.R.* which stated, “it is not necessary to add a new instruction on consent simply because evidence of consent is produced.” *W.R.*, 181 Wn.2d at 767, n.3; Op. at 17.

First, it is important to recall the actual holding in *W.R.* *W.R.* held that the State bears the burden of disproving, beyond a reasonable doubt,



the defense of consent because consent negates the element of forcible compulsion. *Id.* at 765. The portion of *W.R.* that the Court of Appeals relied upon is dicta because *W.R.* was a juvenile case with a bench trial. *See State v. Hurtado*, 173 Wn. App. 592, 606, 294 P.3d 838 (2013); 181 Wn.2d at 760. Accordingly, jury instructions were not at issue in the case.

Second, it is important to note this dicta is wholly incompatible with this Court's precedent regarding other defenses. For example, the defense of diminished capacity can "negate the culpable mental state of a crime by showing that a given mental disorder had a specific effect by which his ability to entertain that mental state was diminished." *State v. Stumpf*, 64 Wn. App. 522, 525, 827 P.2d 294 (1992). However, this Court has held a defendant is entitled to a diminished capacity instruction if he presents sufficient evidence to warrant the instruction. *State v. Griffin*, 100 Wn.2d 417, 419-20, 670 P.2d 265 (1983). It is reversible error for a court to not instruct the jury on this theory of defense. *Id.*

Similarly, this Court has recognized that the defense of intoxication can negate the mens rea of certain crimes. *See State v. Thomas*, 109 Wn.2d 222, 229, 743 P.2d 816 (1987); *see also State v. Swagerty*, 60 Wn. App. 830, 834, 810 P.2d 1 (1991) ("evidence of voluntary intoxication may be used to negate a defendant's mental state

when the existence of a particular mental state is a necessary element of the crime charged”). But just like the defense of diminished capacity, this Court has held that so long as the defense presents sufficient evidence of intoxication, the defendant is entitled to this instruction. *See State v. Conklin*, 79 Wn.2d 805, 809-810, 489 P.2d 1130 (1971).

No reason exists to carve out an exception for the defense of consent. Accordingly, this Court should accept review. RAP 13.4(b)(1); RAP 13.4(b)(3).

**3. The Court of Appeals’ opinion raises important questions concerning the constitutionality of Washington’s two strikes law.**

In 1993, the Legislature amended our criminal sentencing laws in accordance with an initiative passed by voters to divest judges of discretion and require courts to sentence “persistent offenders” to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. *State v. Manussier*, 129 Wn.2d 652, 659, 921 P.2d 473 (1996); RCW 9.94A.570. The Persistent Offender Accountability Act (“POAA”) is commonly referred to as the “three strikes” law, but under certain circumstances, two offenses can subject an individual to life without parole. *See id.* An individual becomes a “persistent offender” subject to life without parole if he is convicted of a “most serious offense” and if the individual was previously convicted of certain crimes, including child molestation in the first degree. RCW

9.94A.030(38)(a)(i), (b)(i). Rape in the first degree is a most serious offense. RCW 9.94A.030(33)(a); RCW 9A.44.040(2).

Because Mr. Teas (1) was previously convicted of the crime of child molestation in the first degree; and (2) is currently convicted of rape in the first degree, the POAA compelled the court to sentence Mr. Teas to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Mr. Teas committed the predicate offense that required the sentencing court to impose life without parole—child molestation in the first degree—when he was between the ages of 17 and 19 years old. Op. at 6.

In *State v. Moretti*, 193 Wn.2d 609, 446 P.3d 609 (2019), this Court assessed whether it was permissible under our constitution to sentence someone to life without the possibility of parole under the POAA if one of the defendant’s predicate offenses occurred when the defendant was a youth. To determine whether this was permissible, this Court assessed whether a national consensus existed against using a crime committed as a young adult to enhance the sentence of an adult who commits a later strike. *Id.* at 821. In holding this was not contrary to our constitution, this Court observed that “many state courts have held that when sentencing an adult recidivist, it is not cruel and unusual to consider strike offenses when the offender was not just a young adult but a juvenile.” *Id.* at 822.

A difference exists between three strikes and two strikes cases because the vast majority of states with three strikes laws *do not* sentence individuals to life without the possibility of parole for committing two offenses. See Vincent Schiraldi et. al, *Three Strikes and You're Out: An Examination of the Impact of 3-Strikes Laws 10 years after their Enactment* 13-18 (Jan. 2003);<sup>3</sup> see also *State v. Flores*, 114 Wn. App. 218, 223, 56 P.3d 622 (2002) (noting that Georgia, Montana, New Mexico, Montana, and South Carolina are among the only states that impose life without the possibility of parole for two strikes).

The rarity with which other states impose life without parole for two strikes coupled with this Court's jurisprudence regarding youthful defendants raises doubts on the constitutionality of imposing life without parole where the single predicate offense occurred when the defendant was a youth. See, e.g., *State v. O'Dell*, 183 Wn.2d 680, 358 P.3d 359 (2015); *State v. Bassett*, 192 Wn.2d 67, 428 P.3d 343 (2018). This Court should accept review. RAP 13.4(b)(3).

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<sup>3</sup> [http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/04-09\\_rep\\_threestrikesnatl\\_ac.pdf.pdf](http://www.justicepolicy.org/uploads/justicepolicy/documents/04-09_rep_threestrikesnatl_ac.pdf.pdf)

**E. CONCLUSION**

Based on the foregoing, Mr. Teas respectfully requests that this Court accept review.

DATED this 26th day of November, 2019.

Respectfully submitted,

/s Sara S. Taboada  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Sara S. Taboada – WSBA #51225  
Washington Appellate Project  
Attorney for Appellant

## Appendix A

August 20, 2019

**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON**

**DIVISION II**

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

JEREMIAH ALLEN TEAS,

Appellant.

No. 51098-7-II

PUBLISHED OPINION

LEE, J. — Jeremiah A. Teas appeals his conviction for first degree rape by forcible compulsion, arguing that (1) the prosecutor engaged in numerous instances of misconduct, (2) the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give his requested consent instruction, and (3) his sentence under Washington’s Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA) constitutes cruel punishment under article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution. We disagree and affirm.

**FACTS**

**A. THE RAPE AND INVESTIGATION**

R.C.<sup>1</sup> posted an advertisement offering massage services under the “Escorts” category of an online forum. 3 Verbatim Report of Proceedings (VRP) (Sept. 12, 2017) at 287. Teas, who was 39 years old at the time, responded to the advertisement and arranged for R.C. to give him a

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<sup>1</sup> We use the victim’s initials to protect her privacy.

massage at R.C.'s apartment. When Teas arrived at R.C.'s apartment, she led him into her bedroom and closed the door behind them. R.C. bent over to place her cellphone on the bedside table, at which point, Teas jumped on her back, held a pocketknife blade to her throat, and said he was going to rape her.

R.C. told Teas that she would "do whatever he wanted" if he put the blade away. 3 VRP (Sept. 12, 2017) at 297. Teas put the blade away and had sexual intercourse with R.C. for a couple of minutes. Teas had difficulty maintaining an erection, so R.C. suggested that she get lubricant to help. Teas agreed, and R.C. walked toward the bedroom door. Teas intercepted R.C. at the bedroom door and instructed her not to leave the bedroom. R.C. struggled with Teas at the door, pushed the door open, and ran screaming toward her roommate's bedroom. R.C. hid in her roommate's bedroom until R.C. looked out the window and saw Teas exiting the front of her apartment building. R.C. contacted law enforcement.

Teas left his knife and hat in R.C.'s bedroom. The knife handle later tested positive for both R.C.'s and Teas's deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) profiles. A sample swab of the hat also matched Teas's DNA profile. And samples taken from stains found on R.C.'s bedsheets matched Teas's DNA profile. The samples taken from R.C.'s bedsheets tested negative for the presence of blood. Law enforcement later detained Teas, and he claimed that he was nowhere near R.C.'s apartment but was only in the area visiting a friend.



B. RELEVANT PORTIONS OF TRIAL

1. Witness Testimony

The State charged Teas with one count of first degree rape by forcible compulsion. At trial, R.C., law enforcement, including Deputy Richard Osborne of the Clark County Sheriff's Office, and a forensic scientist with the Washington State crime laboratory testified to the facts discussed above.

R.C. testified that after Teas put his knife away, he asked her to kiss him and perform oral sex on him. R.C. said no to both requests. On cross-examination, R.C. admitted that she was not a licensed massage therapist.

The sexual assault examination nurse who examined R.C. testified that R.C. told her the same facts detailed above, except R.C. told her that Teas suggested the lubricant, not R.C.

Teas also testified and denied having sexual intercourse with R.C. According to Teas, he only expected to receive a "happy ending" massage from R.C. 5 VRP (Sept. 13, 2017) at 673. Teas stated that R.C. had asked him to take off his pants, and that he pulled them down to his mid-thigh. R.C. then "proceeded to take off her pants that she was wearing." 5 VRP (Sept. 13, 2017) at 657. Teas asked R.C. if she would kiss him or perform oral sex on him. R.C. said no to both requests. Teas "was trying—having some problems trying to become erect and she had said, 'Well, we need to have a condom on because I am not on any birth control.'" 5 VRP (Sept. 13, 2017) at 658. R.C. then gave Teas a condom that she had stored in the desk next to her bed. Teas still had difficulty maintaining an erection, and R.C. "proceeded to ask if she could get some lube, hence, ask for a penis pump to help [him] become erect because [he] was having trouble[] with it." 5

VRP (Sept. 13, 2017) at 658. At this point, he reached into his pocket to give R.C. money and accidentally displayed the knife he had kept in his pocket. R.C. ran away screaming at the sight of the knife, and Teas quickly left the apartment.

On cross-examination, Teas repeatedly denied that he expected to receive any service other than a massage from R.C. He also claimed that the two never had sexual intercourse because he was unable to maintain an erection.

2. Request for Consent Instruction

At the close of evidence, Teas proposed a jury instruction on consent. The trial court found that the evidence at trial did not support the instruction because Teas claimed that sexual intercourse never occurred, not that it was consensual and denied Teas's request to include a consent instruction.

3. Opening Statement and Closing Argument

During opening statement, the prosecutor stated, "The DNA from the blood stain on [R.C.]'s bed matched the defendant's DNA." 2 VRP (Sept. 11, 2017) at 196. In closing, the State argued that R.C.'s version of what happened between her and Teas had "been consistent from the very beginning" in what she told police, the sexual assault examination nurse, and defense counsel. 6 VRP (Sept. 14, 2017) at 724. And the State argued that the jury could conclude from this consistency that R.C. did not fabricate the details of what happened.

Later, in discussing Teas's knife, the prosecutor argued:

Now, it is not a gun. It's not a firearm. It's not a pistol, a revolver, because those are, per se, deadly weapons. Okay? But the manner in which this instrument, this implement was used, with either blade, and the proximity to a person's neck, constitutes a deadly weapon.

And we know that something like this has been used in the past. Okay? I'm not saying—what I'm about to say, and I will preface this by saying this is not a terrorist act. This is not even close to 9/11. Okay? But we all know what was reported about the people who meant to harm on—on those planes that crashed into the—the twin towers. What did they have? Box cutters.

This, ladies and gentleman, with this blade exposed, the manner in which it was used, is a deadly weapon.

6 VRP (Sept. 14, 2017) at 735-36.

The State also argued that all of the DNA evidenced placed Teas in R.C.'s bedroom. The State then argued that Teas's testimony "defie[d] logic" and "ma[de] no sense" because Teas told the police he was nowhere near R.C.'s apartment. 6 VRP (Sept. 14, 2017) at 733.

So that's another reason why, ladies and gentlemen, the defendant decided to testify. He saw the overwhelming evidence against him. Couldn't deny the DNA. Could not deny the DNA.

....

... Again, the estimated probability of selecting an unrelated individual at random in the U.S. population with a matching profile is 1 in 130 quintillion. These are things that the defendant cannot dispute, cannot rebut. And so that's why he got on the stand yesterday and came—came up with a story to try and explain away what happened. And he wrapped up some of the things that have been proved to be true. For example, his presence there, because he can't deny that he wasn't there because he was. But he had to explain why and how and then deny that he was able to engage in sexual intercourse.

6 VRP (Sept. 14, 2017) at 747-48.

Teas did not object to any portion of the State's closing argument. The jury found Teas guilty as charged.

C. SENTENCING

Teas had a prior conviction for first degree child molestation. The record shows that this crime was committed sometime between July 1994 and September 1996, when Teas was between the ages of 17 and 19. Based on his prior conviction of first degree child molestation, the court sentenced Teas to life in prison without the possibility of release under Washington's Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA).<sup>2</sup>

Teas appeals.

ANALYSIS

A. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

Teas argues that his conviction must be reversed because of prosecutorial misconduct. Teas asserts that the prosecutor committed misconduct by (1) directly commenting on Teas's exercise of his constitutional right to testify, (2) comparing Teas's knife to the weapon used in the 9/11 terrorist attacks, (3) referencing facts not in evidence, and (4) vouching for R.C.'s credibility. We disagree that the prosecutor's conduct requires reversal.

1. Legal Principles

To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, a defendant must show that the prosecutor's conduct was both improper and prejudicial. *State v. Emery*, 174 Wn.2d 741, 756, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). The effect of a prosecutor's conduct is viewed in "the context of the total argument, the issues in the case, the evidence addressed in the argument, and the instructions given

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<sup>2</sup> RCW 9.94A.570.

to the jury.” *State v. Monday*, 171 Wn.2d 667, 675, 257 P.3d 551 (2011) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting *State v. McKenzie*, 157 Wn.2d 44, 52, 134 P.3d 221 (2006)).

We first determine whether the prosecutor’s conduct was improper. *Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 759. If the prosecutor’s conduct was improper, then the question turns to whether the prosecutor’s improper conduct resulted in prejudice. *Id.* at 760. Prejudice is established by showing a substantial likelihood that the prosecutor’s misconduct affected the verdict. *Id.*

If the defendant fails to object to the prosecutor’s remarks at trial, he or she “is deemed to have waived any error, unless the prosecutor’s misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice.” *Id.* at 760-61. Under this heightened standard of review, the defendant must show that “(1) ‘no curative instruction would have obviated any prejudicial effect on the jury’ and (2) the misconduct resulted in prejudice that ‘had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury verdict.’” *Id.* at 761 (quoting *State v. Thorgerson*, 172 Wn.2d 438, 455, 258 P.3d 43 (2011)). In making this determination, we focus on whether the resulting prejudice could have been cured. *Id.* at 762.

## 2. Exercise of Constitutional Right to Testify

Teas argues that the prosecutor committed misconduct by creating an inference of guilt based on Teas’s exercise of his right to testify during closing argument. Specifically, Teas asserts that the prosecutor improperly impugned guilt upon Teas, thus violating his constitutional right to testify on his own behalf under article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution, when the prosecutor argued in closing argument that (1) Teas testified in order to explain the presence of

DNA found in R.C.'s apartment and (2) Teas tailored his testimony to fit with the evidence presented at trial.

a. Standard of review

As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether the waiver standard articulated in *Emery* applies here because Teas did not object to the prosecutor's comments at trial. Teas contends that this assignment of error is not subject to the heightened waiver standard articulated in *Emery* because it directly violated a constitutional right. According to Teas, whenever a prosecutor's improper comments violate a constitutional right, we solely consider prejudice and apply the constitutional harmless error standard. The State argues that the waiver standard articulated in *Emery* is still applicable here. We agree with the State.

It is true that the constitutional harmless error standard applies when a prosecutor's improper comments directly violate a constitutional right. *State v. Espey*, 184 Wn. App. 360, 369, 336 P.3d 1178 (2014); *Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 757. However, a prosecutorial misconduct claim of this nature does not render the framework articulated in *Emery* wholly inapplicable. Teas's argument ignores that we have previously assessed waiver in the context of direct constitutional claims involving prosecutors' improper comments. *See, e.g., Espey*, 184 Wn. App. at 366; *State v. Pinson*, 183 Wn. App. 411, 419, 333 P.3d 528 (2014).

In *Espey*, we considered whether the prosecutor had improperly commented on the defendant's right to counsel by urging the jury to infer that the defendant was lying because he had consulted with an attorney prior to arrest. 184 Wn. App. at 368-69. Before applying the constitutional harmless error standard in *Espey*, we employed the framework articulated in *Emery*

to determine whether the defendant had waived the error by failing to object. *Id.* Similarly, in *Pinson*, we considered whether the defendant had waived his prosecutorial misconduct claim when he failed to object to the prosecutor's express and deliberate comments that his post arrest silence evidenced guilt. 183 Wn. App at 419.

Thus, contrary to Teas's argument, the framework articulated in *Emery* is still applicable. If we determine that the prosecutor's comments here were improper, Teas is deemed to have waived the error unless he can show that the prosecutor's misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice. *See Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 760-61.

b. Argument on why Teas testified

Teas argues that the prosecutor impermissibly commented on his exercise of the right to testify when the prosecutor argued that Teas testified in order to explain the DNA evidence in the case. We hold that Teas waived this error because he fails to show that the prosecutor's comments were so flagrant and ill intentioned that the resulting prejudice could not have been cured.

A criminal defendant's right to testify is expressly protected under article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution. This right is fundamental, and it may not be impaired by counsel or the court. *State v. Robinson*, 138 Wn.2d 753, 758, 982 P.2d 590 (1999). When a defendant decides to testify, the State may not draw adverse inferences from the exercise of that right. *State v. Rupe*, 101 Wn.2d 664, 705, 683 P.2d 571 (1984). Therefore, it is improper for the State to speculate as to why a defendant testified to infer guilt.

Here, the State argued that Teas testified because “He saw the overwhelming evidence against him. Couldn’t deny the DNA. . . . And so that’s why he got on the stand . . . and came—came up with a story to try and explain away what happened.” 6 VRP (Sept. 14, 2017) at 747-48. By speculating as to the reason Teas testified, the State inferred that Teas knew he was guilty based on the evidence and testified so he could make up a story to try and explain away what happened. This was improper.

Nonetheless, we hold that the prosecutor’s comments here was not so flagrant and ill intentioned that the resulting prejudice could not be cured with a jury instruction. As explained above, Teas failed to object to this line of argument. And Teas makes no effort to meet the heightened standard of review articulated in *Emery*. Instead, Teas argues that because his credibility was central to the case, “the prosecutor’s comments undoubtedly prejudiced him.” Br. of Appellant at 23. We also note that the prosecutor attempted to couch the argument around what the evidence at trial showed. Therefore, even if the prosecutor’s remarks resulted in some prejudice, it cannot be said that the remarks were so flagrant and ill intentioned that the resulting prejudice could not have been cured through an instruction to disregard them. Thus, we hold that Teas waived this error by failing to object to the prosecutor’s comments below.

c. Tailoring argument

Teas also contends that the prosecutor impermissibly suggested in closing argument that Teas had tailored his testimony to conform to the evidence presented at trial. Teas relies on *State v. Martin*, 171 Wn.2d 521, 252 P.3d 872 (2011), to argue that general tailoring arguments made during closing argument violate article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution.



In *Martin*, our Supreme Court addressed whether a prosecutor may question a defendant during cross-examination in a way that suggests that the defendant tailored his testimony to conform to the evidence presented at trial. 171 Wn.2d at 533-34. The *Martin* court held that questions suggesting tailoring of testimony during cross-examination of a defendant were compatible with the Washington Constitution, based in part, on the view articulated by Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in *Portuondo v. Agard*, 529 U.S. 61, 120 S. Ct. 1119, 146 L. Ed. 2d 47 (2000). 171 Wn.2d at 535-36. The *Martin* court stated that “[i]t is during cross-examination, not closing argument, when the jury has the opportunity to determine whether the defendant is exhibiting untrustworthiness.” *Id.* at 536. Teas relies on this language in *Martin* to argue that a prosecutor may not argue in closing—as opposed to raising the issue during cross-examination—that the defendant had tailored his testimony.

However, in *Martin*, the court did not decide whether tailoring arguments made during closing argument were compatible with the Washington Constitution. The court specifically noted that “the majority and dissent in *Portuondo* agreed that generic accusations of tailoring are permissible” although “there was disagreement about whether such accusations are permitted during closing argument.” *Martin*, 171 Wn.2d at 536, n. 8. The court expressly declined to decide whether generic tailoring accusations were prohibited under article I, section 22 because the accusations of tailoring in that case were specific, not generic. *Id.*

Following *Martin*, Division One of this court rejected the same argument that Teas now makes based on *Martin*. *State v. Berube*, 171 Wn. App. 103, 116, 286 P.3d 402 (2012), *review denied*, 178 Wn.2d 1002 (2013). The court in *Berube* noted that *Martin* had expressly declined to

address generic tailoring arguments. *Id.* The court further held that “the evil addressed in *Martin* is a closing argument that burdens the exercise of constitutional rights without an evidentiary basis and in a fashion preventing the defendant from meaningful response.” *Id.* at 116-17. However, “[w]hen tailoring is alleged based on the defendant’s testimony on direct examination, the argument is a logical attack on the defendant’s credibility and does not burden the right to [] testify.” *Id.* at 117. We agree with *Berube*.

Here, when viewed in the context of the entire closing, the prosecutor did not make a general tailoring argument. Teas’s trial testimony differed substantially from the statement he made to law enforcement. He told law enforcement that he was nowhere near R.C.’s apartment, and instead was in the area visiting a friend. At trial, Teas made a different statement and admitted that he had arranged for a massage with R.C. and was in her apartment that afternoon. Thus, the prosecutor’s argument was based on the change in Teas’s testimony from his initial statements, which was the type of argument that the *Berube* court approved. *See Id.* at 116-17. Teas fails to establish prosecutorial misconduct on this basis.

### 3. 9/11 Weapon Argument

Teas argues that the prosecutor impermissibly appealed to the passions and prejudice of the jury when he likened Teas’s knife to the weapon used during the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. We agree that the argument was improper, but we hold that it was not so flagrant and ill intentioned that it resulted in incurable prejudice.

An appeal to the passion and prejudice of the jury through use of inflammatory rhetoric is improper. *In re the Pers. Restraint of Glasmann*, 175 Wn.2d 696, 704, 286 P.3d 673 (2012). “A

prosecutor is not barred from referring to the heinous nature of a crime but nevertheless retains the duty to ensure a verdict ‘free of prejudice and based on reason.’” *State v. Pierce*, 169 Wn. App. 533, 553, 280 P.3d 1158 (2012) (quoting *State v. Claflin*, 38 Wn. App. 847, 849-50, 690 P.2d 1186 (1984), *review denied*, 103 Wn.2d 1014 (1985)), *review denied*, 175 Wn.2d 1025 (2012). And though the State has wide latitude to argue reasonable inferences from the evidence, it is misconduct for a prosecutor to urge the jury to decide a case based on evidence outside the record. *Id.*

Teas argues that the prosecutor impermissibly appealed to the passion and prejudice of the jury and referenced facts not in evidence when he compared his pocketknife to the weapon used in the 9/11 terrorist attacks. We agree that this argument was improper.

Contrary to the State’s argument, referencing the destruction of the World Trade Center in the deadliest terrorist act to ever occur on American soil is more than “potentially ill-advised.” Br. of Resp’t at 30. It is a blatant appeal to the passion and prejudice of the jury. However, when viewed in the context of the total argument, the evidence, issues in the case, and instructions provided to the jury, we hold that the prosecutor’s remarks were not so flagrant and ill intentioned that the resulting prejudice could not have been cured with a jury instruction.

The prosecutor referenced the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the context of discussing the deadly weapon instruction and explaining that an item may constitute a deadly weapon depending on the manner in which it is used. The prosecutor did not use the 9/11 terrorist attacks as a central theme in closing argument and explicitly stated that he was not likening Teas’s conduct to a terrorist attack. Viewed in context, the statements were not so flagrant and ill intentioned that the resulting

prejudice could not have been cured with a curative instruction. Because Teas failed to object below and cannot meet this heightened standard, he has waived his prosecutorial misconduct claim on this basis.

4. Arguing Facts Not In Evidence

Teas also argues that the prosecutor engaged in flagrant misconduct by arguing facts not in evidence. Specifically, Teas argues that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence when he (1) referenced a blood stain found on R.C.'s bedsheets during opening statement, (2) claimed during closing argument that R.C.'s version of events had been consistent in order to bolster her credibility, and (3) referenced a witness who never testified at trial.

Again, Teas did not object to any of these remarks at trial. Therefore, he has waived any error unless he can show that the prosecutor's misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that the resulting prejudice could not have been cured with a jury instruction. *See Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 760-61.

First, Teas argues that the prosecutor's reference to a bloodstain containing Teas's DNA during opening statement was improper because it was unsupported by the evidence at trial. It is true that the evidence at trial showed that the sample taken from R.C.'s bedsheets tested negative for the presence of blood. However, the prosecutor's reference to a bloodstain was made during opening statement. A witness's expected testimony is a permissible subject for opening statement. *Thorgerson*, 172 Wn.2d at 444. Because the prosecutor's opening statement only concerned evidence that the State anticipated presenting at trial, the prosecutor's reference to the bloodstain was not improper.

Next, Teas contends that the prosecutor improperly vouched for R.C.'s credibility during closing argument when the prosecutor argued that R.C.'s story had been consistent. We disagree.

“Improper vouching occurs when the prosecutor expresses a personal belief in the veracity of a witness or indicates that evidence not presented at trial supports the testimony of a witness.” *Id.* at 443. And a prosecutor may not state a personal belief as to the credibility of a witness. *State v. Ish*, 170 Wn.2d 189, 196, 241 P.3d 389 (2010).

Teas asserts that the prosecutor's argument that R.C.'s story had been consistent was “patently false” because the detail of who suggested the lubricant had changed with each retelling, as did the detail of whether Teas jumped on R.C.'s back or shoved her onto the bed. Br. of Appellant at 29. However, Teas acknowledges that in each retelling, R.C. claimed that Teas held a knife to her throat, said he was going to rape her, and had sexual intercourse with her. We find that the details as to who suggested lubricant and whether Teas jumped on or pushed R.C. do not render the prosecutor's statement that R.C.'s version of events was consistent “patently false.”

Finally, Teas asserts that the prosecutor argued facts not in evidence when he referenced Deputy Osborne's testimony because Deputy Osborne never testified at trial. We disagree.

A prosecutor commits misconduct by encouraging the jury to decide a case based on evidence outside the record. *Pierce*, 169 Wn. App. at 553. However, contrary to Teas's assertion, Deputy Osborne testified in detail regarding his involvement in R.C.'s case. Therefore, the prosecutor did not commit misconduct by referencing Deputy Osborne's testimony during closing argument.

B. CONSENT INSTRUCTION

Next, Teas argues that the trial court erred when it refused to provide his proposed jury instruction on consent because there was evidence that the sexual intercourse was consensual. We disagree.

1. Legal Principles

A criminal defendant is entitled to have the trial court instruct the jury upon the theory of his or her case so long as there is evidence in the record that supports the theory. *State v. Fisher*, 185 Wn.2d 836, 848, 374 P.3d 1185 (2016). Refusal to give a requested jury instruction constitutes reversible error when the absence of the instruction prevented the defendant from arguing his or her theory of the case. *State v. Buzzell*, 148 Wn. App. 592, 598, 200 P.3d 287, *review denied*, 166 Wn.2d 1036 (2009).

We review de novo the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury instruction when the refusal is based on a ruling of law. *State v. Ayala Ponce*, 166 Wn. App. 409, 416, 269 P.3d 408 (2012). We review the refusal for an abuse of discretion where refusal is based on lack of evidentiary support. *State v. Harvill*, 169 Wn.2d 254, 259, 234 P.3d 1166 (2010). Under this standard of review, we will not reverse the trial court's ruling "unless it was manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons." *State v. Robinson*, 193 Wn. App. 215, 217-18, 374 P.3d 175 (2016). A trial court necessarily abuses its discretion when its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law. *Harvill*, 169 Wn.2d at 259.

2. Consent Instruction Not Required for First Degree Rape

Teas argues that the trial court's refusal to give his proposed consent instruction was manifestly unreasonable because it prevented him from arguing his theory of the case and there was "more than enough evidence" of consent here. Br. of Appellant at 34. We disagree.

A person is guilty of first degree rape when that person "engages in sexual intercourse with another person by forcible compulsion." RCW 9A.44.040(1). "'Consent' means that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have sexual intercourse or sexual contact." RCW 9A.44.010(7). Consent negates the element of forcible compulsion. *State v. W.R.*, 181 Wn.2d 757, 763, 336 P.3d 1134 (2014).

Once a defendant asserts consent as a defense and provides sufficient evidence to support the defense, the State must prove lack of consent as part of its burden of proof on the element of forcible compulsion. *Id.* This is because "[a]s defined, forcible compulsion contemplates force that overcomes actual resistance or threats that place a person in actual fear. There can be no forcible compulsion when the victim consents, as there is no resistance to overcome." *Id.* at 765. In *W.R.*, our Supreme Court specifically noted that "[b]ecause the focus is on forcible compulsion, jury instructions need only require the State to prove the elements of the crime. It is not necessary to add a new instruction on consent simply because evidence of consent is produced." *Id.* at 767, n. 3.

Thus, under *W.R.*, the trial court was not required to provide a consent instruction here because the State was already required to prove lack of consent as part of its burden of proof on

the element of forcible compulsion. Moreover, even without the proposed instruction, Teas was still able to argue his theory that there was consent to engage in sexual intercourse. Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err in refusing to give Teas's proposed consent instruction.

C. CUMULATIVE ERROR

Teas argues that the cumulative effect of the prosecutorial misconduct and the refusal to give his consent instruction resulted in a trial that was fundamentally unfair. We disagree.

“Under the cumulative error doctrine, a defendant may be entitled to a new trial when cumulative errors produce a trial that is fundamentally unfair.” *Emery*, 174 Wn.2d at 766. This doctrine does not apply when the defendant fails to establish how the claimed instances of prosecutorial misconduct affected the outcome of the trial or how combined claims of misconduct affected the outcome of the trial. *Thorgerson*, 172 Wn.2d at 454.

Here, although the prosecutor made improper comments, Teas fails to show how either, or both, instances of misconduct affected the outcome of the trial. Teas also fails to show that the errors rendered his trial fundamentally unfair. Thus, we hold that Teas is not entitled to a new trial based on the cumulative error doctrine.

D. CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT

Finally, Teas argues that his mandatory sentence under the POAA of life without possibility of release violates Washington's Constitution; specifically, article I, section 14's prohibition against cruel punishment. He argues that this provision of the Washington Constitution categorically bars imposition of a sentence to life without possibility of parole on adult offenders who committed a predicate offense under the POAA as a youth. We disagree.



1. Standard of Review

Whether a statute is constitutional is a question of law that we review de novo. *State v. Moen*, 4 Wn. App. 2d 589, 598, 422 P.3d 930 (2018), *review denied*, 192 Wn.2d 1030 (2019). We presume that a statute is constitutional, and the party challenging the statute bears the burden of proving it is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. *Id.*

2. Teas’s Sentence Does Not Violate Article I, Section 14

Article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution bars “cruel punishment.” *Id.* (quoting *State v. Witherspoon*, 180 Wn.2d 875, 887, 329 P.3d 888 (2014)). Its federal counterpart, the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, prohibits cruel and unusual punishment. *Id.* In the context of juvenile sentencing, Washington’s constitutional provision provides greater protection than the Eighth Amendment. *State v. Bassett*, 192 Wn.2d 67, 82, 428 P.3d 343 (2018).

Our Supreme Court recently held that sentencing juvenile offenders to life without parole or early release constitutes cruel punishment in violation of article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution. *Id.* at 91. This holding was based on the national trend toward “abandoning juvenile life without parole sentences,” and the considerable scientific research showing that “the characteristics of youth do not support the penological goals of a life without parole sentence.” *Id.* at 90.

Teas argues that the framework articulated in *Bassett* compels us to hold that it is cruel to sentence an adult as a persistent offender under the POAA when that adult committed one of his predicate offenses as a youth. We disagree.

As an initial matter, Teas’s argument confuses categorical bar challenges and as applied challenges. He asks us to conduct categorical bar analysis, but he simultaneously characterizes his challenge as an “as-applied challenge” to individuals like him as a “category.” Br. of Appellant at 48.

The standard for assessing an as-applied challenge to a defendant’s sentence is articulated in *State v. Fain*, 94 Wn.2d 387, 617 P.2d 720 (1980). In *Fain*, the defendant argued that his sentence under the habitual criminal statute was disproportionate to the nature of his crimes. *Id.* at 390-91. *Fain* outlined four factors that courts are to consider when determining whether a defendant’s sentence is proportional to the nature of his crimes: “(1) the nature of the offense; (2) the legislative purpose behind the habitual criminal statute; (3) the punishment [the] defendant would have received in other jurisdictions for the same offense; and (4) the punishment meted out for other offenses in the same jurisdiction.” *Id.* at 397.

Teas does not challenge the proportionality of his sentence given the particular circumstances of his crime. Instead, he argues that it is unconstitutional to sentence a class of defendants, adults who committed a predicate offense under the POAA as a “youth,” to mandatory life imprisonment. Br. of Appellant at 48. Therefore, even though Teas frames his challenge as “an as-applied challenge” to individuals like him, Teas raises a categorical bar challenge here.<sup>3</sup> Br. of Appellant at 48.

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<sup>3</sup> Teas also argues in the alternative, that if we do not apply categorical bar analysis, we should adopt a new “*Fain+*” standard that accounts for a defendant’s youth. Br. of Appellant at 53. He argues that this new test is necessary because the traditional *Fain* test fails to account for a youthful offender’s diminished culpability. We decline to adopt Teas’s proposed test.

In assessing a categorical bar challenge, we consider “(1) objective indicia of society’s standards to determine whether there is national consensus against sentencing those [of a particular class] to mandatory life imprisonment and (2) our own understanding of the prohibition of cruel punishment.” *Moen*, 4 Wash. App.2d at 601. This second step requires this court to consider “‘the culpability of the offenders at issue in light of their crimes and characteristics, along with the severity of the punishment in question’ and ‘whether the challenged sentencing practice serves legitimate penological goals.’” *Bassett*, 192 Wn.2d at 87 (quoting *Graham v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 48, 67, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010)).

Teas does not provide any legislative enactments or state practices regarding use of “youthful crimes” as predicate offenses under habitual offender statutes. Br. of Appellant at 50. Recently, our Supreme Court held that “Article I, section 14 of the Washington Constitution does not require a categorical bar on sentences of life in prison without the possibility of parole for fully developed adult offenders who committed one of their prior strikes a young adults.” *State v. Moretti*, No. 95263-9 slip op. at 2 (Wash. Aug. 15, 2019)<sup>4</sup>. And review of other jurisdictions’ statutes and case law does not show a national consensus against sentencing adults as persistent

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Teas’s proposal is a misguided attempt to blur the frameworks for analyzing categorical bar and as-applied challenges. And it fails to appreciate the nature and purpose of the *Fain* framework. The *Fain* framework weighs the nature of a particular offense with its resulting punishment. *Bassett*, 192 Wn.2d at 83. This analysis informs whether the punishment is disproportionate to the particular circumstances of a defendant’s crime. *Moen*, 4 Wn. App.2d at 600. Thus, the *Fain* framework is “ill suited” to analyze “a categorical challenge based on the characteristics of the offender class.” *Bassett*, 192 Wn.2d at 83. Indeed, the very policy Teas hopes to advance through his proposed test—considering the characteristics of the offender class—is the precise reason the categorical bar analysis applies here.

<sup>4</sup> <http://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/952639.pdf>

offenders when their predicate offenses were “youthful.” Rather, several jurisdictions have rejected this very argument. *Wilson v. State*, 2017 Ark. 217, 521 S.W.3d 123; *Commonwealth v. Bonner*, 135 A.3d 592 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2016); *Vickers v. State*, 117 A.3d 516 (Del. 2015); *Counts v. State*, 2014 WY 151, 338 P.3d 902.

Moreover, we hold that punishing an adult as a persistent offender when a predicate offense was youthful does not contradict the penological goals of the POAA. The POAA requires superior court judges to sentence persistent offenders to life in prison without the possibility of release. RCW 9.94A.570. A “persistent offender” includes someone who has been convicted of first degree rape, and has on at least one occasion been convicted of first degree child molestation. RCW 9.94A.030(38)(b)(i), (ii)<sup>5</sup>. An “offender” means a person who has committed a felony and is eighteen years of age or older. RCW 9.94A.030(35).

“The purpose of the POAA is the segregation of persistent offenders from the rest of society, generally deterring others.” *State v. Hart*, 188 Wn. App. 453, 461, 353 P.3d 253 (2015). As the Tenth Circuit has explained, “Unlike defendants who receive severe penalties for juvenile offenses . . . recidivists have been given an opportunity to demonstrate rehabilitation, but have elected to continue a course of illegal conduct.” *United States v. Orona*, 724 F.3d 1297, 1308 (10th Cir.), *cert. denied*, 571 U.S. 1034 (2013). Punishing an adult for continuing to commit violent crimes after being given the chance for rehabilitation supports the penological goal of separating repeat offenders from the rest of society.


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<sup>5</sup> RCW 9.94A.030 has been amended since the events of this case transpired. Because the amendments do not materially affect the statutory language relied on by this court, we refrain from including the word “former” before RCW 9.94A.030.

Our courts have recognized that “children are less criminally culpable than adults, and the characteristics of youth do not support the penological goals of a life without parole sentence.” *Bassett*, 192 Wn.2d at 90. However, Teas is not a juvenile being punished for a crime he committed as a juvenile. He was 39 years old when he raped R.C. by forcible compulsion. Therefore, the mitigating factors of youth were not applicable when he was sentenced for this crime. Teas’s constitutional challenge to his sentence fails.


CONCLUSION

We hold that Teas’s prosecutorial misconduct challenges fail, the trial court did not err when it refused to provide his proposed jury instruction on consent, there was no cumulative error necessitating reversal, and his constitutional challenge to his mandatory sentence to life without possibility of parole fails. Accordingly, we affirm.

  
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Loe, J.

We concur:

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Worswick, J.

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Maxa, C.J.

## Appendix B

October 28, 2019

**IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON**

**DIVISION II**

STATE OF WASHINGTON,

Respondent,

v.

JEREMIAH ALLEN TEAS,

Appellant.


No. 51098-7-II

ORDER DENYING MOTION  
FOR RECONSIDERATION

Appellant, Jeremiah A. Teas, filed a motion for reconsideration of this court's published opinion filed on August 20, 2019. After consideration, it is hereby

**ORDERED** that the motion for reconsideration is denied.

FOR THE COURT: Jj. Worswick, Maxa, Lee

  
\_\_\_\_\_  
Lee, J.

### DECLARATION OF FILING AND MAILING OR DELIVERY

The undersigned certifies under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on the below date, the original document **Petition for Review to the Supreme Court** to which this declaration is affixed/attached, was filed in the **Court of Appeals – Division Two** under **Case No. 51098-7-II**, and a true copy was mailed with first-class postage prepaid or otherwise caused to be delivered to the following attorney(s) or party/parties of record at their regular office or residence address as listed on ACORDS:

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[prosecutor@clark.wa.gov]  
Clark County Prosecutor's Office
- petitioner
- Attorney for other party

  
MARIA ANA ARRANZA RILEY, Legal Assistant  
Washington Appellate Project

Date: November 26, 2019



# WASHINGTON APPELLATE PROJECT

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